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Abstract 
The sociology of organizations has ignored the evolution of and variation in 
enterprise rules, budget systems and accounting rules. This paper takes a broad 
approach to accounting rules, arguing that they are related to large variations 
in enterprise forms and in industry problems. The rule making and enforcement 
. , 
.' apparatus o f .  modern society is described. Both external and internal aspects of 
accounting rules and ' budget sys tems are explored. 
The Sociology of Enterprise, Accounting, and Budget Rules: 
An Overview of the Analysis of Institutional Rules and 
Organizational Functioning 
Every manager spends a good deal of his time worrying about budget 
allocations and the applicationof specific rules. The overall budget system and 
the specific allocation policies are for the individual manager an 
accounting-budgeting regime. For many purposes, and at most times, they are 
treated as from God - timeless and unchangeable, possibly arbitrary, but 
determinative. Even if the manager tries to evade them or manipulate them, he 
does so with a sense of testing the fates. Moreover, sovereigns, supreme 
authorities, spend much time creating budgets, reviewing accounting information, 
creating and thinking about accounting systems, and processing information 
'derived from these systems. 
I 
But it is striking how little at tention sociologists of organizations have 
given to the analysis of accounting and budgeting systems, how little attention 
they have given to the rules governing ownership,--the transfer of property 
rights from one gro.up or individual to another. For instance, if one examines 
the index of leading books written by sociologists of organizations one finds 
little mention of money, finances, accounting, or budget. None of these terms 
appear in W. Richard Scott's, Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems 
(1981), and this is an extraordinarily fine book. Or again, if one examines the 
index of Charles Perrow's important, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay 
(1979), there is one reference to budget, none to accounting, and none to 
financing. There is a single reference to . fundraisingl. Richard Hall's 
textbook, Organization, Structure and Process (1981) has no references to 
accounting, budgeting, or finance; one does find two references to economic 
factors. There are several references to resources. The same lacuna is found in 
James D. Thompson's classic book, Organizations in Action (1967). There is a 
brief discussion of planning and budgeting under the discussion of coordination 
by planning; but that is more a general discussion of scheduling than it is of 
budgeting. There may be 'in these books some discussion of resource acquisition, 
but very little discussion of the rules governing resource acquisition and - - 
allocation. Even among theorists who make power dependence and resource balance 
issues central to the analysis, such as Jeffrey Pfeffer, there is little 
discussion of specific accounting systems, budget rules, allocation schemas, as 
these operate to shape the operation of organizations, their growth and 
transformation. In the index of Pfeffer's Organizations and Organization Theory . 
(1982), there are three pages cited on budget allocation, no discussion of 
. 
accounting rules, .one reference to capital allocation, no reference to finance, 
" 
and' no reference to money. 
. . 
The reasons for this neglect of accounting and budget rules as shapers of 
organizational behavior and as major sources of variation between organizations 
are complex. Note that political scientists (Wildavsky, 1979) and economists 
(Niskanen,-l971), . . dealing with public organizations and public expenditures, have 
. . developed a substantial literature dealing with budget systems. But for the 
private sector, until recently, accounting and budget systems have been treated 
as outside the domain of political scene and sociology. & 
Economists have assumed the ratiohality or impr'ovability of accounting , 
rules. Accounting rules are seen as either economizing devices or as 
political-traditional imperfections and barriers to economizing. Economists 
treat technology as a hard constraint on production functions (e.g., changeable, 
but outside the economist's domain), and therefore they analyze the implications 
of technology for cost. But they assume that accounting rules are improveable if 
we would only be rational in our approach to organizations. They do not, by and 
large, treat management technology as real. Accounting rules may be an 
imperfection but not a hard constraint. 
Sociologists have given much attention to technology-task constraints on 
organizations. They also have extensively analyzed power and authority. In many 
organizations a major component of the system of rule is expressed through 
budgets and accounting rules by making allocations. And these sociologists have 
. . 
largely ignored. - Why sociologists have ignored the issue is a matter for the 
sociology of knowledge. Sociologists of organizations found accounting to be 
dry. Accounting seemed fixed. In a sense, accounting rules have been treated as ' 
givens, as part of a technical-cultural process which need not be analyzed. 
. . I believe that we are about to witness a large scale change in the utility 
of analysis of accounting and budget rules and enterprise rules for the analysis 
of organizations. I feel a bit like Rip Van Winkle. I went to sleep ten to 
fourteen years ago, believing that an important topic was overlooked (Zald, 
1970a, 1970b). During the last decade I have largely worked in other areas, only 
occasionally doing work on organizations. Now, as I return to the study of 
.complex organizations, I find an active research community addressing issues of 
. , budget and accounting systems. New journals, such as Accounting Organizations & 
Society, directly address problems of the relationship of organizations and 
accounting. Economists working on the theory of property rights and agency, are 
very much aware. of the role of incentive systems, incentive rules and financing 
2 arrangements for affecting organizational behavior and outcomes . Authors such 
as Feldman & March (1983), concerned with signalling of facts and the processing 
of information, lead us to examine the accounting systems and budget systems 
which are major processors of information for organizations. 
I find it somewhat strange, however, that, although there has been 
increasing interest in these topics by scholars either interested in organization 
theory, or the effects of incentive systems, these interests have not penetrated 
more general theoretical treatises. Until they do, general discussion of control 
and authority will remain abstract. and detached. In this paper I wish to outline 
a research program and a set of research topics that would eventually allow us to 
show how organizations are deeply shaped by enterprise rules, by various 
accounting and investment rules and systems. I see the venture as potentially 
useful for accounting researchers, but even more important for a deep, 
historically based, culturally informed analysis of organizations. 
Our topic is broader than just a focus on accounting rules. I take it that 
accounting rules and accounting practice are methods for measuring and assigning 
costs and incomes to various categories for use in information systems. In a 
narrow sense, the sociology of accounting rules would not deal with budgets, 
would not deal with financial investment measurement systems, would not deal with 
the larger processes and rules governing property rights in organizations and 
criteria for changing property rights. Accounting and budget systems are set up 
within a. set of sovereign relations, yet sovereign relations are not given, and 
the choice of enterprise-property rules affects accounting rules and relations. 
Changes in the law of corporations affects accounting rules and practice. I 
believe that nesting the narrower analysis of accounting rules in the larger 
budget-property rights system, both internal and external to organizations, will 
lead to a fuller understanding of the regulated and rule-based nature of 
organizations. 
The system of enterprise rules, accounting regulations and budget and 
accounting practices that shaped the behavior of the 14th century merchant of 
Florence was much different from those surrounding the railroad magnate of the 
late 19th century. And those, in turn, were much different from those 
surrounding the late twentieth century real estate developer. Only as we 
understand more of those differences and learn to think about them will we grasp 
the essential transformations and differences among organizations. 
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What Kind of Organizational Theory? 
What type of organizational theory which will. best end up accomodating and 
being invigorated by close attention to rule systems and budget allocation 
systems? First, the theory or framework has to see the evolution of 
organizations and related accounting systems in historical context. Of course, 
the trends of modern life and of modern society are such as to spread accounting 
budget systems across nations. Thus, Leontief's input-output matrix accounting 
for national economies may be -as useful in Gambia and Grenada as in Great 
Britain. Nevertheless, over ti.me and in different industries at different times, 
and in different types of socio-economic systems, the nature of accounting rules, 
the type of system selected, vary substantially. The rule systems that we -are 
talking about are part of cultural systems for societies as a whole. (National 
boundaries are permeable boundaries.) Any rule or rule system develops in one 
organizat:on, or to meet specific emerging problems and then are implemented in 
many other organizations or situations. The usual pattern is for a process of 
innovation, proposal, dissemination through professional groups and professional 
socialization and transmission to individual organizations and institutions. 
This occurs both through the good practice manuals of professional groups, 
textbooks, the practices of auditing firms and the requirements of key external 
groups such as the Securities Exchange Commission, the Snternal Revenue Service 
and the civil and criminal courts. . So, in the first instance', the theory or 
the organizational framework has to be one that is open to historical context and 
experiences the process of adoption and implementation. 
Second, as implied above, the framework has to be open to, and sensitive to, 
industry and organizational differences. The rules that get applied, the 
accounting-financial regimes, are sharply structured by industry differences, by 
how accountants, executives and regulatory agencies have come to grips with the 
problems of control and allocation in specific industries. Insurance accounting 
is different from public utility accounting, which, in turn, is different from 
hospital accounting. They.differ in their reserve requirements, in the relation 
of accounting information to managerial decisions, and so on. Moreover, 
not-for-profit government agencies, partnerships, and corporations have 
fundamentally different reporting requirements and accounting systems. And of 
course, the accounting allocating systems that, exist in socialist societies will 
differ on fundamental dimensions from those in capitalistic systems. 
Third, the organizational theory should understand the play of adoption and 
reaction to rules in specific organizations. For example, all research 
universities in the United States must have procedures for estimating indi'rect 
costs on research grants and allocating revenues from indirect cost returns. 
While the former may be standardized to meet government auditing requirements, 
the latter varies widely, so that indirect costs in some universities flow 
through directly to the research investigator or the research unit, and in other 
universities indirect cost returns are loosely coupled to the decision process as 
to how much space, equipment, facilities to give the research generating units. 
What kind of theories or theoretical framework will be most useful? It 
seems to me that we first can say that some theories, or theoretical frameworks, 
while very valuable for some classes of problems, will not turn out to be very 
useful to the study of organizational rule systems, accounting rules, budget 
allocations. In particular, I do not believe that population-ecology models 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977), or abstract organization-environment models and 
approaches are nuanced enough to come to grips with the textured nature of 
accounting rules and budget systems. The more abstract models seem to assume 
much of the rule system as an intervening black box in examining the more macro 
processes. Their conceptualization of environment harks back to general systems 
theory or biological analogy, denuding society of political economy systems, of 
goals, values, human agency, power and conflict. On the other hand, I believe 
that approaches drawing upon the process of institutional, cultural understanding 
in generating rule systems and acceptance of budget accounting procedures will be 
quite useful (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). For John Meyer and associates 
institutional processes surround organizations. They are not merely 
rational-technical production systems. Instead, they are imbedded in 
legitimation processes and expectations. Accounting systems are part of 
institutionalized expectations. I also believe that micro analyses dealing with 
symbol construction, detailed, . almost anthropological, historical analysis of 
rules will be very interesting and useful. 
For myself, however, I believe that a fruitful way to go is found in a 
marriage between the new Marxist based theory of organizations as reflected in 
the works of Stuart Clegg (1980) and others and the older institutional analysis 
ref.lected in the works of Phil Selznick (1949; 1948); Alvin Gouldner (1954), 
Burton Clark (1983), and my own political economy analysis (1970). Since the 
organizational analysis a la Selznick and early Gouldner is well known, let me 
discuss for a moment the advantages of utilizing a neo-Marxian approach that is 
wedded to this kind of organizational analysis. (Cf. Goldman, 1984) 
The large claim that I am making is that organizational theory must become 
more historically grounded, must be attuned to the larger system in which 
organizations exist. To say that organizational theory must be historically 
grounded means more than that it must take account of time and historical change. 
We have had a discipline of administrative history and of business history that 
have been of little value to the more generalizing aims of organizational theory. 
Except for the seminal works of Alfred Chandler (1963; 1977), organizational 
history has not informed more sociological concerns. The kind of organizational 
,history, or historical perspective, that will be of value is one that has a motor 
of systemic change behind it. Whether it is a theory of societal rationalization 
in a Weberian sense (McNeil, 1978), a theory of political-state transformation 
(Therhorn, 1978, Skowronek, 1982), or a theory of the major institutional trends 
of economy and society, the larger matrix must be understood as undergoing 
transformation in some system property sense, rather than merely historical 
change. Chandler has a sense of administrative response to size and complexity 
but misses, or pays little attention to, either the transformation of labor 
relationships or the larger political economy of capitalism. Much of what 
accounting does is fuel reports and relations to government and a changing 
banking-investment matrix. (Burk, 1982; Mintz and Schwartz, 1985) 
In recent years, a school of Marxist, or Marxist-oriented, writers have 
begun to examine the transformation of organizations. Edwards (1979), Burawoy 
(1979), Braverman (1974), Clawson (1980), and Clegg (1981) are representative 
writers. These writers are largely concerned with the transformation of . 
management-labor relationships. The shop floor is a situs for class conflict and 
control over the accumulation-appropriation cycle. For Clawson, for instance, 
bureaucratization is a tool of managerial control over labor and the 
contracting-out system. What all of these authors share is a sense- that 
organizational change reflects larger changes in bourgeoisie, managerial, working 
class relations. But such a perspective leaves out much and would by itself have 
little to do with the topic of this paper. In a sense, these authors .look at 
management-labor relationships and their change to the exclusion of the other 
transformations of firms and organizations in a capitalist .society. There is 
little about conflict between organizations or conflict between capitalists and 
managers, or conflict between elite class fragments, or conflict between large 
corporations and small organizations, or conflict between stockholders and the 
norms of ethic of public regardingness and the norms of bucaneer capitalism. 
There is little sense here that government's role as an actor has had a major 
impact on the budget-accounting systems of organizations, not only through things 
such as the Securities Exchange Commission and related legislation, but through 
a variety of taxes and reporting requirements. Intriguingly, by being so attuned 
to the shop floor, much of this literature ignores the large political 
transformations that have reshaped both the shop floor and politics in Western 
societies (but see Burawoy, 1983). 
Stewart Clegg (1981), however, begins to lay out a framework which can be 
exploited for this larger agenda. Clegg essentially sees organizations as social 
.locations where a number of groups and classes interact and conflict. Moreover, 
the conflicts and differences of interests that are expressed in any single 
organization are carried along over time and. may represent class fragment 
interactions. Segments of capital may conflict over control of specific 
organizations. Elite networks create conflict for control and fight to control'a 
given corporation or industry. Owners and large capitalists may require 
accounting systems and incentive systems, as they become removed from everyday 
operations from the needs of the owner-manager. There may develop conflicts 
between line and staff managers that reflect themselves in professional 
sub-groups and professional standards in the imposition of power relations. 
Managers and workers may have different relationships. Petit bourgeoisie, small 
capitalists, may have a different set of needs and relationships with large 
corporation managers than petit bourgeoisie owners with each other. Each of 
these conflicts, or potential conflicts, may involve both external professional 
groups and state action. The demands for state action, or for professional 
standards, take particular organizational needs and conflicts out into a 
professional-public arena where laws, administrative regulations and institutions 
are established both to regulate the behavior of organizations to establish norms 
for the given sector, and to set up new institutional arrangements. In this 
process the interests of individual groups get transformed into a 
political-normative bargain that establishes regulations which may benefit some 
and hurt others. Over time, the new regulations, or new standards, become the 
baseline for further changes in accounting, or in the stock market, or in tax 
policy as the new regulations become opportunities for groups to exploit at a 
more micro level until another cycle of change takes place. The ongoing "game" 
as described by Crozier and Friedberg (1980) is nested in this larger systemic 
change, 
Clegg's contribution is very important because it permits a historically 
oriented state-organization interaction. But there are limits to the new Marxist 
perspective. First, the new Marxists tend to underplay industry differences. 
(But see Zimbalist, 1980) In the quest for historical generalization, they tend 
to underplay the extent to which the capitalist system varies in important ways 
$,, by industry structure. 
Second, as noted above, the new Marxists have been much more concerned with 
labor management relationships, to the detriment of the analysis of other aspects 
of organizational development. There is little attention to the competitive 
nature of industries and to how change in the technological processes and in 
production, transforms organizations and creates demands for organizational 
structures of coordination and control. Managerial structure, so ably analyzed by 
Chandler (1962; 1977) is ignored. There is little attention to the 
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institutionalized normative system surrounding profit and practice in industries. 
The financial rule structure surrounding extractive industries is very different 
from the financial rule structure surrounding the banking industry or the 
insurance industry. 
Third, different nations, equally called capitalist, will webb the flow of 
capital and the intersection of centralized decision making with organizations in 
a very different way. To this point, the Marxist sociologists have been unready 
to address these issues (though political scientists have). Finally, this work 
.addresses labor-management relations only in profit making firms. They have not 
addressed the issue of state firms, of non-profit firms, and so on. Yet it ought 
to be clear that a major transformation of the modern world is the growth of 
either publicly owned organizations or organizations dependent upon the public 
fisc. We live in a world in which most of the airline companies of the world, in 
which most of the banking systems, in which many automobile manufacturers, in 
which many airplane manufacturers, in which almost all utilities are either 
publicly owned or publicly regulated. An analysis of the variety of 
budget-accounting systems and larger rule systems' must certainly be attuned to 
this master trend. 
Although the new Marxists give us a major tool for thinking about 
regulations as a part of class conflict and state action, they have less to say 
about organizational dynamics per se, partly because their object of analysis is 
not really organizational change or even organizational control. What kinds of 
tools do we have to pay more attention to organizations per se? I want to 
suggest that organizational analysis of the Selznickian type (1949), or my own 
political economy approach (1970, a and b), combined with a strong emphasis upon 
differences in the financial-technological-regulatory-matrix of specific 
industries will take us far along the way. 
Selznickian analysis is holistic. It treats the interplay of organizations 
in environments. ' It examines the goals, conflicts, and commitments of the 
powerful and the powerless as they interact to produce products and obtain 
resources and legitimacy from the environment. My own political economy 
approach uses a strong analogy to societal political economy. It examines the 
interaction of the internal political structure and economy (system for producing 
goods and services) with the external polity and economy in which it finds 
itself. 
In the remainder of the paper I wish to take up specific topics in which a 
historical-organizational approach will use the rule setting process, the 
accounting budget process, as aspects of organizational analysis. First I will 
discuss 'enterprise rules, the transformation of rules or property rights, 
property ownership, and financial investment that can transform the operation of 
organizations. These property and enterprise rules set constraints on accounting 
and budget allocation systems. Secondly, I discuss the external process of rule 
making and rule setting and its impact upon accounting procedures. Third, I will 
touch upon enterprise forms and industry differences in accounting and budgeting 
regimes. Fourth, I will discuss the valuational-accounting process and budget 
systems within organizations. . . 
Ownership Rights, Combination Rules, and Enterprise Transformation 
The making of modern capitalism is directly related to the growth of the 
corporation as an enterprise form. While other forms continue--sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, not-for-profit enterprises, government ownership, 
cooperatives,- all'capitalist societies have developed a substantial corporate 
sector. Moreover, public regulation of the terms of ownership of 
non-governmental forms has increased, especially in corporate regulation. There 
is a substantial literature on the growth of the corporate form. [See. the 
classic work by John Davis (1961); for its economic-control advantage from a 
property rights perspective see the work of Fama and Jensen (1983)l. One master 
trend of capitalism was the development of the unrestricted corporation. The 
growth of the corporate form was facilitated by and, in turn, led to the 
transformation of financial markets. A second master trend, at least in the 
United States, deals with the regulation of corporate ownership-from the 
establishment of regulated stock markets to anti-trust laws. 
If we were to carry out Clegg's agenda we would show how, as the corporate 
capitalist system developed, growth and change led to demands for political 
change, creating public regulation. That history would show a kind of phase 
movement of either economic-political crisis or scandal, social movement and 
political agenda setting, legislative enactment, and then a transf ormed rule 
system in which players (large controllers of wealth) interact in the game of 
accumulation and control. 
That is the large macro picture. But, for those interested in the game, 
there is a micro picture of change that also deserves attention. There is-a set 
of rules which have changed over time, regulating the terms of takeover bids, of 
declaring intention to buy, of the conditions under which ownership of stock 
translates into rights to nominate board members, and so on. There are rules 
' . governing who bears the cost of proxy fights, rules governing board members' 
fiduciary responsibility in general and in the face of takeover bids. Each 
change in rule benefits different parties--intrenched management, large 
shareholders,' small shareholders, outside investors, foreign versus local 
investors,- and so on. ~hese micro rules, combined with economic trends for 
industries, accounting rules which lead to the over-or-under-valuation of 
properties, tax liabilities, and the larger anti-trust laws, shape the ongoing 
expression of merger-takeover activity. 
. . 
To sharpen the analysis let me suggest the following general propositions 
that bear on organizational control and merger processes: 
. . 
. . I. Within 'the political economy. of capitalism, the transformation of 
enterprise rules affects the potential .balance of power and control between 1) 
internal top management and outside investors with access to large pools of 
monies; 2) 'the ability of families to continue to control enterprises they 
develop; 3) the extent to which the short and long term interests of 
stockholders are protected in the contests for control of enterprises. 
11. 'Anti-trust rules effect the structure of organizations and industries in 
that they shape investment opportunities across and between industries. Choices. 
of conglomeration, within industry oligopolization, vertical integration, all 
respond to enterprise rules. 
Since managerial strategies; tasks, and organizational structure are shaped 
by the number of product lines, inter-relations of material transformation tasks 
internalized in the firm and number of related and unrelated markets that the 
firm faces, enterprise rules indirectly affect managerial strategy. Finally, the 
structure of power in capitalist nations is shaped by these enterprise rules. 
Although the.focus has been on enterprise rules in the for-profit sector, a 
parallel analysis could be made for the governmental sector and for other, 
enterprise forms. Note, for instance, how the American polity leaves. formal 
authority to local and state governments in contrast to either England or France. 
"Property rights" of local officals are deeply vested in the United States, where 
they are negligible in France. The hot debate in ~ngland in the summer of 1984 
was whether Margaret Thatcher had violated the British Constitutiion as she moved 
to denude local governments of authority. 
Rule Making, Surveillance, and Enforcement 
,Enterprise rules and accounting rules are different in that the former deal 
with property rights, the ownershsip and rights of disposal and allocation of 
goods and services, .facilities and equipment, while the latter deal with the 
valuation and recording of property, goods and services. They are similar, 
however, in that for many purposes the rules are set external to the enterprise. 
In an earlier set of papers (Zald, 1978; Zald and Hair, 1972; Wiley and Zald, 
. . 
1968) I attempted to examine the processes by which modern society creates a 
social control matrix for industries, a class of organization producing 
relatively similar goods and services. The argument was that, to understand the 
social control of organizations, you had to take into account a) that a major 
source of control were market forces, and markets. The term "markets" applies to 
competing organizations, that is industries, and b) that society developed rules 
and regulations that were industry and technologically specific. There are 
control agents and procedures for the education industry, for medical 
accreditation; there are control agents and procedures for the regulated 
utilities and for the construction industry, and for boiler inspection and 
insurance.. So, to understand social control of industries, products and 
processes, you had to examine the organized processes of control. 
Once you begin to dig into non-market mechanisms of control, the visible, 
rather. than the invisible hand, you also need to make a distinction between rule 
making, infraction surveillance, and enforcement. 
Rule making, surveillance and enforcement may be a function of one agency. 
Or they may be more or less separate tasks. In the accounting area, relevant 
rules are established by professional standard setting boards such as the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. Their use, or the application- of the 
rules, is surveyed by auditors, and the rules are enforced by auditors, 
investors, the courts, the Securities Exchange Commission, and Internal Revenue 
Service. There is an inter-linked social control process in which information of 
malfeasance, or even the hint of malfeasance, triggers reactions. More than many 
social control areas, auditors and accountants are subjected to formal probity 
norms, to standards of disinterestedness, that are remarkable. Contrast the 
. . 
. norms for outside legal counsels and for auditors. Although auditors are hired 
by the company that they audit, their continuing credibility depends upon their 
independence. However, note that auditors have leeway in interpreting and 
applying rules and are dependent on clients for their income. As accounting 
firms have added management consulting services, they have become increasingly 
intertwined with their clients. 
A major characteristic of the social control system surrounding publicly 
held corporations in the United States is that there is a dense network of - 
intensely interested onlookers-the business media, lenders, investors, and 
* 
business analysts. Many of these onlookers are potential sanctioners. 
surveillance and reports of malfeasance translates quickly into the sanctions of 
many onlookers. 
0, 
There is a growing body of literature dealing with the sociology 'and 
politics of standard setting in Accounting. [Watts and ~immerman (1978); 
Holthausen and Leftwich, (1983)l. And there is also a growing body of literature 
on the impact of accounting information on stockmarket performance. Moreover, as 
banking crises have accelerated in recent times, the efficiency of. these 
regulatory mechanisms has been questioned. What is lacking is a sense of the 
inter-penetration of control mechanisms. Altough articles and books about 
specific regulatory mechanisms may treat the history of that specific rule or 
organization, they too often insulate the history from larger systemic trends. 
James Burk's recent dissertation (1982) on the transformation of the stock 
market, the institutionalization of the stock market, the growth of fiduciary 
* 
investment in pension funds and insurance companies, and the development of 
prudential norms, is a good example of an institutional analysis that helps us 
understand some of the transforming enterprise rules in institutions as control 
agents.. The Burk dissertation, which does have good historical sense, is a 
welcome addition to the literature. But note that in- focusing upon a specific 
institution, the stockmarket and investment norms of insurance companies and 
pension funds, Burke has little to say about the rest of the control apparatus 
over stocks and corporations, such as the Securities Exchange Cormqission. A 
larger view must take into account the interplay of public regulation with 
private. 
Accountants sometimes treat separately the application of accounting 
standards for balance sheet and income reporting from tax related reporting. 
Implicit is an underlying assumption that the balance sheet is 'a tool of 
rationality, as opposed' to the opportunism of tax reporting. Obviously, the 
distinction is less important to a fully behavioral, socially nested view of 
accounting. Yet it is clear that changes in tax law shape the choice of 
accounting rules. Tax law shapes management decisions, and accounting rules are 
chosen partly in terms of their tax implications in the short and medium run.. In 
this sense tax law, if not a control agent, operates in the same manner as a norm 
enunciated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in shaping both accounting 
rule choice and behavior. So, any examination of . the rule set ting-surveillance 
apparatus ought to focus on tax law related standards as well as professionally 
mandated standards. A significant agenda item for the future involves the 
interplay of control mechanisms and institutions. 
-20- 
Enterprise Form, Industry and Accounting 
Every accountant knows that the type of accounting used is dictated by 
enterprise form. Not-for-profits and governmental agencies tend to use forms of 
fund accounting,. profit making firms use double-entry accounting and income 
statement reconciliation. Not-for-profit and governmental agencies typically do 
not institute depreciation reserves, nor do they include separate capital 
accounts. ~ccountin~ form is partly related to the structure of.contro1 and 
funding, but it is also related to institutionalized rule systems. After all, 
American state legislators could require universities to charge students for 
depreciation of dorms and of university buildings. That is, there is nothing 
inherent in the form of accounting systems that we use any specific rule. There 
is a logic to their' adoption, but there are alternate logics which grow out of 
the institutionalized rationality of political economic systems. 
There is a received wisdom about the consequences of accounting and 
budgeting forms for economizing, for decision-making.about the use of money. It 
is believed, for instance, that not-for-profits over-invest in fixed assets 
because they are not required to fund depreciation accounts, nor do they worry in 
the short run about operating expenditures attached to bricks and mortar. 
Similarly, governmental .bureaucrats are believed to have little incentive to 
economize and have a positive incentive to expand annual budgets. From the point 
of view of the sociology of organizations it would be useful good to have the 
received wisdom, and related speculation synthesized. From Niskanen (1971), and 
others, we could begin to develop a sense of the recurrent pitfalls of budget 
forms, investment rules and incentive systems. Fama and Jensen's (1983) 
extension of property-rights, agency theory to show how residual claimants are 
treated under different enterprise forms, lays out a scaffolding for analysis. 
But even within enterprise form, industry differences lead to the development of 
industry specific rules and regimes. In this section I want to ask how 
industrial differences relat e to capital markets and accounting rules. 
Most.of the sociology of organizations has tried to focus on organization as 
a general phenomena. Often organizational theorists have really had in mind 
organizations with monetary reimbursement for labor. Thus governments and 
business could be studied as one general form, ignoring voluntary associations, 
churches, and social movement organizations. In recent years, an interest in 
technology, task structure variables, and environments, has led some writers on 
organizations to realize that organizational variability was strongly linked to 
underlying industry variability, that organizations with similar products and 
production systems might have similar life cycles, internal structures, career 
patterns, and inter-organizational relations. (Hirsch, forthcoming; Dess and 
Beard, 1984). We have just begun to exploit industry as an object of analysis. 
For many purposes, it may be more important than what I have called "enterprise 
form." Compare profit making and not-for-profit hospitals. Surely, they are 
different in their economizing incentives, but they are similar in their 
complexity, extent of government regulations, problems of authority, labor 
markets, and rates of technological change. 
One aspect of industry is the accounting-taxation regime that applies to it. 
This is well-tread ground for the accountant. Problems of depreciation, the 
establishment of reserves for risk-taking, are well understood. There are 
specialists in the treatment of research and development expenses, in gas and oil 
exploration accounting and capitalization, in insurance accounting. As new 
3 
products are created with different technologies, visibility of results and time 
horlzons, risk, and monopoly characteristics, accountants, legislatures, and 
lawyers confront the problems of assessing value and developing mechanisms of 
accounting. As this happens, each industry, or many industries, develop a 
relatively distinct accounting taxation regime. 
Soon, I believe, we will have a map of organization-industry characteristics 
that tells us much about specific organizations based upon the industry in which 
they exist. (Dess and Beard, 1984). We will be able to say something about the 
socio-demographics of labor, size, rates of growth, concentration ratios, 
turnover, unionization, all as a function of industry. We also will know how 
particular industries interface with other industries. What we need as an 
accompaniment is a parallel map of the accounting, budgeting capital regimes. 
It is my belief that the enterprise form chosen in an industry is partly a 
response to problems of accounting and income reporting in particular. The 
structure of investment in gas and oil exploration and in construction is partly 
a function of the rule system and incentives that are in operation in these 
particular industries under capitalism. (They do it differently in the Soviet 
Union!) Whether an industry is populated by partnerships, privately" held 
corporations, publicly owned corporations, proprietorships, relates to capital 
demands and flows, which are shaped by accounting devices, tax law, and 
investment instruments. 
In construction, the largest companies have net worths that would easily 
rank them in the Fortune 500. Yet they tend to be family-held, private 
corporations; they are heavily dependent upon capital gains and the intricacies 
of depreciation rules for their profitability. Return on investment may be high 
in the long term, but annual profits from operating income may be quite low in 
the short term. Indeed, networth may grow based on unrealized capital gains, 
. -23- 
while annual profits may be negative. There are other reasons that large 
property firms are not publicly held. Capital is easily raised through mortgages 
for tangible assets, for instance, so that stock ownership as a mechanism for 
raising capital is not required. A similar kind of analysis explains the capital 
flow and structure of the two-tiered oil and gas exploration industry. One tier, 
the majors, internalizes risks across many different exploration sites or in 
consortiums of majors. A second tier uses the advantages of tax codes and quick 
write-offs. to create limited partnerships for exploration. In doing so, a tier 
of an industry ties into the income tax laws related to individuals. 
To a great extent, I believe, that the inter-connections of industry and 
capitalist class fragments can be better understood if we treat them not just as 
related to product-technology~classes alone, but if we treat them in relationship 
to investment tax opportunity created by the complex accountingltax laws which 
govern specific industries. 
Internal and External Budgeting and Accounting Processes 
Here, . I discuss internal and external budgeting systems and rules and the 
problem of developing sociological theory about them. By external budgeting 
systems and rules I mean any long-term formula for revenue transfer. Spot 
contracts are related to pure markets, but all government reimbursement formula 
or long-term contractual relations creates long-term budget-revenue systems. A 
reimbursement or funding rule creates a dependency relation when a significant. 
portion of revenue comes from one source over an extended time period. Thus, the . ' 
contract-accounting rules between suppliers and manufacturers, as well as between 
manufacturers and dealers in the automobile industry, can be subjected to 
systematic analysis. Similarly, the reimbursement formulas and related systems 
for hospitals, schools, and universities can be subjected to systematic analysis. 
External budgeting, funding rules and procedures can have a range of impacts on 
the operation of the organizations to which they apply. 
First, and a most traditional topic for organizational analysis, they affect 
organizational structure in a very basic sense. The billing-reimbursement system 
creates a demand for clerical-billing activity. The more detailed the reporting 
requirements and the greater the number of reimbursing agents with different 
requirements, the more organizational personnel are involved in the funding 
system. It has been estimated that the difference in reimbursement systems for 
hospital care in Canada and the United States account for as much as 12 percent 
of the differential costs of hospitals in those countries. To the extent that 
each medical test, supplies and procedures for each individual must be accounted 
for in order to receive reimbursement from either a patient or an insurance 
company, as contrasted with either total budget reimbursement or with diagnostic 
category reimbursement, one can easily see the differential in reporting 
requirements. 
Second, external funding formulas shape organizational choices and policies. 
In the medical system the reimbursement formula affects patient care decisions - 
not only who to treat, but how to treat. Choices of specific processes, choices 
of in-hospital treatment versus external treatment are all subject to 
reimbursement formula issues. In high schools, attendance policies are set 
partly in response to "student days" components of state reimbursement fo.rmulas. 
Third, in some cases, reimbursement formulas and agreements relate to the 
shape of organizational goals and major .product strategies. public universities 
have to choose between an in-state and out-state clientele, partly dependent upon 
state regulation of the proportion of out-state students and tuition 
differentials . Medical schools reduce or expand their entering classes and 
choose mixes of research 'and training partly in response. to similar kinds of 
constraints. 
Finally, the formulas and reimbursements are related to other control 
systems. How much quality oversight accompanies the reimbursement relationship? 
How directly and'deeply are funders able to intervene in setting organizational 
goals and priorities? Being a supplier to IBM involves you not only in a deep 
technical relationship in which IBM personnel nurse and supervise your work, but 
. ' also involves you in a level of secrecy only matched by working on new weapons . 
sys tems . 
Let me now turn to a discussion of internal budgeting and accounting 
systems. It is here that most progress has already been made. The long-term 
transformation of organizations in Western society has been accompanied by real 
innovations in internal budgeting and accounting. Chandler (1977) has discussed 
the. growth of cost-accounting as a necessary tool of rationality for upper 
management facing a diverse and complex company. The development of the notion 
of profit centers within enterprises that located both expenditures and income at 
a sub-enterprise level, was a major transformaton of organization that leads to a 
change in the locus of authority and the incentive expectation system surrounding 
managerial roles.. Profit centers and divisional decentralization can be seen as 
the major social invention allowing organizations to overcome the problem of 
diseconomies of scale. (Chandler, 1963). 
Other drganizations besides corporations have variations of profit center 
accounting and budgeting. Hospitals treat clinics and departments as profit 
9 centers and universities, such as Harvard and Vanderbilt, have 3 "bottoms-up" 
I 
I approach (or "each tub on its own bottom"), in which as many costs as possible 
I - 
I 
I are allocated to units and in which tuition, research and endowment funds are 
debited to schools. To the extent that profit center logic is a major 
determinant of allocations and priority setting for units, an economizing logic 
is imposed within the enterprise: an economizing logic of internal capitalism, in 
fact. 
I Indeed, profit center logic implies a level of 'intra-enterprise competition 
I and intra-unit jcompeti~ion much- like that of the market. Profit center systems 
immediately raise the issue of transfer pricing and the politics of transfer 
pricing within organizations. It should be noted that how one determines 
transfer prices and decisions runs into both political - and cultural-symbolic 
problems and choices. Upper-level authorities have to have ad judicatory rules 
and mechanisms for resolving conflicts stemming from the price setting and 
purchasing decisions internal to the firm. The cultural-symbolic problem stems 
from the criteria for costing and pricing. The rationality of economics is 
different from the rationality-practice of accounting in evaluating marginal 
costs and arriving at pricing decisions. (Abdel-Khalik, A.R. and Lusk, 1974; 
Swieringa & Waterhouse, 1982.) Recently Eccles (1984) has shown that transfer 
pricing systems vary systematically between corporations with different degrees 
of vertical integration. 
'Another aspect of accounting and information systems within organizations is 
the development of alternative indices of unit performances. Deans at 
prestigious universities count the number of Guggenheims received, the amount of 
grant money, and the number of memberships in the National Academy of Sciences, 
as well as the number of student enrollmments. Pharmaceutical companies develop 
refined measures of quality. In the more refined ,systems we move . away from 
account'ing per se to the borderlines of operation research and statistical 
theory. Some of the same questions asked about external funding apply here. How 
does the system shape organizational structure? How does the accounting system 
affect substantive decision making? Does it, for example, lead one school in the 
University to try and raid another school for students, depending upon the 
tuition transfer price that isallocated? Does the accounting rule and the 
budget system affect the locus of discretion and decision making? It should be 
pointed out that the literature on alternative governmental budgeting systems 
quite directly asks "how does a change'in budgeting systems affect who gets to 
decide what," as much as it does the question of "does the difference in the 
system change substantive decisions?" What games and coalitions possibilities 
are created by different accounting rules and budget systems within the 
organizations? (Wamsley, 1983). 
A final aspect of budget and rule systems in organizations has to do with 
the sociology of capital and investment decisions. It is striking how few 
systematic studies we have of how major decisions of capital allocation are made 
in organizations. Textbooks treat the growth of return on investment thinking in 
the 1950s as a systematic tool for analyzing investment decisions, yet we have 
little discussion of how major investment decisions are made in a variety of 
organizationsi little comparative study of the efficacy of formal procedures and 
rationality. Aside from Louis Pondy's early study (1964) it is hard to come 
across a systematic analysis of both the structure of investment decision making 
and the game as it gets played out in that process. (Cf Pettigrew, 1973.). 
The internal rules and budget systems encompass the life of the manager. 
Although overall budget regimes evolve and accounting rules change, the operating 
manager acts as a rule taker. The individual decisions of managers and the 
cumulative force of those decisions on the directions of organizational change 
are partly shaped by budget formulas and accounting rules. 
Conclusions 
I have sketched an approach to accounting rules, budget systems, and 
enterprise forms and rules that would permit organizational theory to become 
less abstract, to be more in tune with the historically evolving normatively 
guided system that surrounds organizations and the managers within them. The 
sociological theory of organizations, I have argued, assumes an 
accounting-budgeting regime. But those regimes can be treated as sociologically 
problematic. Both in the long run, in the adoption of such systems as double 
entry book-keepping, and in the short run in changing depreciation rules, 
organizational behavior, choice and directions are shaped by the rule or system 
adopted. This is not news to accountants. It is news to ~ociologists. 
It should be clear that what is proposed will have radical consequences for 
the way sociologists do their business. I have argued that understanding the 
budget-accounting regime requires attention to the historical-external processes 
surrounding industries within the changing socio-economic system. Enterprise 
form and industrial differences will enter as key topics in the sociology of 
organizations. 
Although what is proposed may not be news to accountants, it will have 
consequences for them as well. For too long accounting and budget processes have 




It is ilonic that Perrow doesn-t discuss budget processes more, since one 
of the finest chapters in his doctoral dissertation (1960) deals with a chief 
executive's manipulation of the budget and capital expenditure classification. 
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